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Travels without a donkey…around Chateau Latour 
 
when a man sits down to write a history…he knows no more 
than his heels what lets and hindrances he is to meet with in his 
way…Could a historiographer drive on history, as a muleteer 
drives on his mule – for instance, from Rome all the way to 
Loreto, without ever once turning his head aside either to the 
right or to the left – he might venture to foretell you to an hour 
when he should get to his journey’s end – but the thing is, morally 
speaking, impossible: For if he is a man of least spirit, he will have 
fifty deviations from a straight line to make with this or that party 
as he goes along, which he can no ways avoid.   
Laurence Sterne 
 
For we all of us, grave or light, get our thoughts entangled in 
metaphors, and act fatally on the strength of them. 
             George Eliot 
 
They that weave networks shall be confounded 
                 Isaiah xix, 9 
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Introduction 
Taking in anything from laboratories, courts, West African colonial trading 
stations and South American botanical research groups to urban engineers, 
Berlin house keys, the reception of the message of Jesus, and medicine in 
late nineteenth century France, the work of Bruno Latour has helped a 
generation of scholars to rethink their approaches to inquiry.  At the same 
time, he has encouraged those convinced and invigorated by that work to 
believe that they are redefining the meaning of social science itself.  Notable 
here are his attacks on sociology, which by appealing to an unexamined 
concept of ‘society’ to explain whatever it is studying, neglects the very thing 
that needs investigating: the ways in which society is continually being made.  
Much of Latour’s work – some of the best empirical and ethnographic work 
of the last three decades - has been just such an investigation.  
 Sociology badly needs to rebut these charges, and if sociologists 
would go and collect the key more often than they do they might find that 
the discipline has enough armoury in its locker to do so.  Instead of doing 
that, here I focus on another strand of Latour’s writing, the part in which he 
makes his most general positive claims on behalf of the intellectual stance, 
or view of the world, that informs his work.  He sometimes calls this 
‘experimental metaphysics’.   Because it has appeared more than once as the 
last chapter of or appendix to one of the empirical studies it might be 
thought of as a theoretical or methodological adjunct to them.  But in recent 
3 
 
writings it has begun to take on a life of its own, nowhere more so than in 
his efforts to re-imagine politics.  The headline terms are ‘political ecology’, 
‘the politics of nature’, and ‘a parliament of things’.   Here I assess those 
efforts.  I conclude that, for all its ingenuity, Latour’s vision of a new politics 
is grounded less in ‘the winding path of practice’ than in wishful thinking 
fostered by the misuse, or overextension, of his theoretical tools, notably 
metaphors and diagrams.   
Along the way I will say also something about his most widely 
discussed metaphysical move, the denial of a distinction between human and 
non-human actors.  But I will not say much, because, contrary to what both 
fans and opponents may say, it seems to me more a useful – though not 
very original - device for enriching our sense of the ways in which certain 
sorts of world are made.        
 
Metaphors We Social Scientists Live By  
I begin with three distinctions, because with these in place we may be better 
equipped to make a critical assessment of Latour’s project.  They are: 
between metaphor at the level of discourse and at the level of words; 
between relative and absolute metaphors; and between metaphor as a 
resource for and metaphor as an object of inquiry.   
 Let us say with Geertz that the use of metaphor occurs when, 
confronted with an object we do not understand, we make use of devices 
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that have proved their worth in the understanding of other object domains 
(Geertz, 1983).  Such devices may be images, but they may equally be more 
or less coherent bodies of concepts, entire vocabularies, but used in 
unfamiliar settings.  Let us add for good measure that in the social sciences a 
lot of what we call metaphor is technically synecdoche, the appeal to 
imagery or a body of concepts appropriate to one part of something to 
understand the whole: game theory is an example.   
The distinction between the appeal to images and the metaphorical 
use of concepts  is roughly equivalent to Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between 
metaphor at the level of words and metaphor at the level of discourse 
(Ricoeur, 1978).  ‘Man is a wolf to man’ is a metaphor at the level of words; 
‘society is a series of strategic games’ is a metaphor at the level of discourse.  
The former dramatizes the human situation and may or may not open up a 
new sensibility towards it; the latter suggests a way of conducting inquiry 
and a vocabulary for doing so.   This distinction is important because some 
social scientists use metaphors mostly at the level of discourse without using 
them at the level of words, that is, a master metaphor, consisting of a body 
of concepts borrowed from ‘elsewhere’, defines their approach to inquiry as 
a whole, but they write without much lyricism.  Both game and systems 
theorists are examples.  Some, by contrast, use metaphors at the level of 
words but not at the level of discourse: Max Weber’s ‘iron cage’ is a 
metaphor at the level of words, a dramatic aside, an exemplary image, but 
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Weber’s inquiry as a whole did not rely on a single master metaphor.  Some 
use metaphors at the levels of both discourse and words: in the work of 
Erving Goffman, for instance, the idea of drama or frame shapes the 
inquiry, while the text itself is replete with metaphorical asides.  Some social 
scientists use metaphors more skilfully than others, some treat them lightly 
enough to get social analysis done and to broaden social science’s 
imaginative possibilities, others get trapped by them: once you say society 
‘is’ a system or a game or a text you commit yourself to saying so much in 
one particular way that you may neglect other ways of seeing.        
Social scientists who use metaphors at the level of discourse in this 
way, far from seeking to turn inquiry into poetry or art, usually do so in the 
hope of placing it on a more scientific or quasi-scientific footing.    
Metaphor at the level of words, by contrast, can take us in two directions: 
on the one hand, they are dramatic asides, ways of characterising a particular 
set of circumstances; on the other, they may acquire the status of, or be 
deliberately employed as, exemplary images of the human condition.   
It was partly to make sense of such metaphors that Hans Blumenberg 
distinguished between relative and absolute metaphors.  Relative metaphors 
are those that are ‘on their way’ to becoming concepts; they are provisional 
orienting devices for an inquiry that in its maturity will make use of 
concepts, or they are already concepts borrowed from elsewhere.  Absolute 
metaphors, by contrast, ‘“answer” those apparently naïve questions that are 
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in principle unanswerable and whose relevance consists very simply in the 
fact that, because we do not pose them, but find them posed in the grounds 
of our existence, they cannot be eliminated’ (Blumenberg, 2010: 23).   The 
most basic of such questions is ‘what is the world?’ and many of 
Blumenberg’s books are about the images to which our tradition has 
repeatedly resorted in order to respond; those images persist, not as 
unchanging or time-resistant archetypes but as objects of continual 
reinterpretation and variation: the laughter of the maid as Thales of Miletus 
falls into the well; Prometheus chained to the rock; the situation of the 
spectator who, on firm ground, gazes out at a shipwreck; the book of 
nature; Plato’s cave and ways out of it (Blumenberg 1985; 1989; 1996).  We 
will, so to speak, return to Plato’s cave later on.   
Absolute metaphors can never be reduced to conceptuality because 
they are responses to the most unanswerable but at the same time most 
basic questions of human existence.  If relative metaphors are ‘on the way’ 
to conceptuality, absolute metaphors are, as Blumenberg puts it, an 
inexhaustible reservoir to which conceptuality periodically returns in order 
to replenish itself.  And because the questions to which they are answers are 
posed not by us but for us, the answers they do provide are never definitive, 
which means that myths can never be ‘brought to an end’; if Plato’s cave or 
the legend of Faust or the myth of Prometheus have persisted as leitmotifs 
of the European cultural tradition, any effort either to provide a final, 
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definitive version of them, or to step outside the tradition of imagery that 
they have built up, is bound to fail, or at least cannot be given the 
appearance of success by anything other than metaphysical sleight of hand.  
We will see later on that Latour’s more recent efforts to reimagine politics 
depend upon a failure to take this point into account.   
A third distinction, and perhaps the most elusive, is between 
metaphor as an object of and as a resource for inquiry.  The obvious point is 
that one may be interested in the way metaphors have had an influence on 
society or history or politics or thought without deploying metaphors 
oneself.  Many of Blumenberg’s (numerous) histories of philosophy are 
histories of basic images, or absolute metaphors; but he himself does not 
deploy them.  So in Work on Myth, his claim that ‘the 19th century 
understood itself in terms of the myth of Prometheus’ is not a piece of 
speculation, or a Lovejoyan claim about a ‘unit ideas’; it is a statement about 
the pervasive use of an image, supported by copious documentary evidence.  
By contrast, when Zygmunt Bauman says that the modern state is a 
‘gardening state’, he claims to be describing a way of seeing characteristic of 
European public administrators; but while he offers some textual evidence 
that some administrators of rulers deployed such imagery, it is scanty at best.  
The ‘gardening state’ is instead shorthand for an attitude that Bauman thinks 
lay behind or beneath the practices of these administrators: it is, in an 
important sense, his own metaphor, but unlike Weber’s iron cage, he wants 
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to do more with it than dramatise our modern condition; he wants us to 
believe that it describes a set of attitudes with causal properties.  So whereas 
the image of Prometheus is not Blumenberg’s own but a cultural leitmotif 
whose fortunes he traces, and Weber’s iron cage is his own (adopted) image 
for his sense of his own times, Bauman’s ‘gardening state’ exists in an 
epistemological no man’s land where the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is 
usually found: having picked up the image from somewhere, he projects it 
onto the historical record: analytical tool and object of inquiry merge.              
 
Metaphors Latour would like us to live by 
With these distinctions in mind we may now assess Latour’s skill in handling 
his metaphors, two in particular: the ‘modern constitution’ and ‘network’.   
The thrust of We Have Never Been Modern, his most widely-read book, 
is summed up in the following passage, of which Blumenberg himself might 
have approved had the word ‘always’ been replaced with ‘in many respects’: 
‘we have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-
Nietzschean.  No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts…’ 
(Latour, 1993: 67).  Pleas for continuity of this sort in politics and literature 
are familiar enough, and have been the stock-in-trade of anti-rationalist 
theorists of custom and tradition from Montaigne and Burke to Eliot and 
Oakeshott.  Latour wants to go further and include science, and pleads for 
an approach to the study of the modern world that anthropologists, so he 
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claims, have always taken to non-Western societies: the idea here is not to 
consider the modern world as a single coherent cultural whole, but to think 
in ways that allow us to follow the threads that connect political, scientific, 
cultural, economic, legal and other phenomena.     
This is made difficult, so he claims, by the standard social science 
theory of social differentiation according to which science, politics, art and 
economics and so on are separate powers, realms, subsystems, value-spheres 
or language games, each of them with its own logic or regional ontology.  In 
particular, rather than accept a distinction between nature and society that 
this theory implies, Latour wants to find a way of seeing nature and society 
as equally constructed; he thinks that some sociologists of science have 
tended to see nature as socially constructed while treating society as an 
unexamined, unconstructed explanatory court of appeal.  It is this view of 
society as unconstructed that informs what he calls ‘the modern critical 
stance’, and which has had such a deadening effect on modern sociology; 
instead of displaying curiosity and about the endlessly mysterious and 
puzzling character of the relationships that make up the worlds we have to 
get about in, most sociologists, so Latour claims, treat ‘society’ as a default 
explanatory position that supports their claims to know, and to know better 
(Dunn, 1984).   
Latour presents his alternative to mainstream sociology as a response 
to problems that arise in the empirical study of science.  In order to 
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understand the connections, associations, or threads that keep science going, 
the concept of ‘society’ was worse than useless; a more supple and adaptable 
terminology was required, one that didn’t resort to the dead end moves of 
‘social constructionism’, and one that didn’t get in the way of the 
investigator’s efforts to convey the processes by which actors make 
whatever part of the social world they are involved in.   Latour’s branch of 
science studies is ‘made up of those who have been thoroughly shaken when 
trying to give a social explanation of the hard facts of science’ (Latour, 2005: 
94); social scientists, and particularly sociologists, have a choice between two 
approaches to inquiry: either the invocation of ‘social context’ at every 
opportunity (the modern critical stance), or the painstaking exploration of 
the mystery of the social bond.   
‘Thoroughly shaken’ suggests a certain modesty - the old tools just 
won’t do the job we need them to – that sits uneasily with the hectoring 
tone of We Have Never Been Modern, where we read that the modern critical 
stance (which depends on the separation of phenomena into distinct 
domains) is ‘the default position of our mental software’, the mental 
software of ‘ordinary actors…in the developed world’.   Latour tries to 
describe that mental software via a metaphor, which he calls ‘the modern 
constitution’.   
The modern constitution is said to ‘do’ what any constitution must: it 
establishes distinctions between domains, performs the ‘work of 
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purification’; but it also, so it is claimed, generates hybrids, those 
phenomena that cannot be assigned to one domain alone.  Constitution is 
given a capital C in order ‘to distinguish it from the political ones’ (15) but 
like all good metaphors it can only work by being extendable in certain ways, 
that is, opening up a horizon of implication, making us think things that we 
couldn’t think without it.  The modern constitution may not be political in 
the strict sense but the constitutional vocabulary is fertile enough.  It allows 
Latour to ‘describe in the same way how all the branches of our government 
are organised’ (Latour, 1993: 15), to talk of the modern constitution’s 
‘assemblies’ and of a ‘third estate’, consisting of entities that belong neither 
to society nor to nature, and which may from time to time ‘invade’ those 
assemblies; the space in which these quasi-objects, neither human nor non-
human, appear, is the ‘middle kingdom that the modern constitution cannot 
account for’.     
Now this sort of move, in which a one activity is a source of 
metaphorical imagery for all others, is familiar enough; Goffman’s 
dramaturgical sociology, game and systems theory do the same; so did the 
‘society as text’ literature when it was fashionable.  When Goffman says ‘the 
world is, in truth, a wedding’, he means that there is no area of human 
interaction that cannot be considered from the point of view of its ritual 
aspects.  Elster treats strategic games as a fertile source of terminology for 
talking about activities that are not strategic games.  
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‘The modern constitution’ is not like this; Latour does not see it as an 
investigator’s device, a political metaphor that might help us conduct 
inquiry.  The ‘modern constitution’ is more like Bauman’s ‘gardening state’: 
it is Latour’s own term, but a term for something that he thinks exists in the 
world, our mental software.  Among other things, this rhetoric of discovery 
allows him to claim that the modern constitution is incomplete; only two 
parts of it have been written, by modern science and by modern politics, 
operating largely in isolation from one another.  The task of the 
anthropologist is to write the final part, make the connection between them 
visible, and rethink the character of the entities that make up the histories of 
nature and society; when we do that it will turn out that they are ‘actors 
endowed with the capacity to translate what they transport…the serfs have 
become free citizens again’. (Latour, 1993: 81).  Any sense that the 
constitution is an analytical tool disappears when he says that ‘half of our 
politics is constructed in science and technology.  The other half of Nature 
is constructed in societies.  Let us patch the two back together, and the 
political task can begin again’ (Latour, 1993: 144).  Part of that political task 
is the establishment of a ‘parliament of things’, an assembly or gathering in 
which both human and non-human agents – or ‘actants’ - may play a part.   
The act of interpreting the world, then, is itself interpreted as an act 
of changing it.  The modern constitution accounts for much of what is 
wrong with the way we think about nature and society, but it is incomplete, 
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and so we can finish the job and in the process improve it and the world.  
Latour is fond of rejecting ‘the modern critical stance’ with its unmasking 
attitude that wants to get behind appearances, but his procedure here is 
oddly reminiscent of the tradition of ‘immanent critique’ that used to be one 
of that critical stance’s favourite devices.   
The new science studies was not supposed to resemble the modern 
critical stance, merely to forge a philosophy of social science that could: i) 
make sense of the fact that scientists often treat their data and equipment as 
actors with agency (albeit that the agency may consist largely of a refusal to 
cooperate), and ii) allow the investigator to follow ‘the winding path of 
practice’, the threads that connect whatever it is that makes up the world 
scientists create and maintain.  The answer to i) was to treat all entities 
involved in any way in the process of science on an equal footing, to say that 
human beings and planets and recording equipment and animals are all 
‘actants’; the answer to ii) was the concept of ‘network’.   
If it is to do the job he wants it to, network has to be Latour’s 
metaphor at the level of discourse, on a par with Parsons’ system or Elster’s 
game or Goffman’s drama, a device for orienting any inquiry into any case 
of world-making.        
In Reassembling the Social that is what it appears to be, at first.   
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It [network] has the same relationship with the topic at hand as a 
perspective grid to a traditional single point perspective painting: 
drawn first, the lines might allow one to project a three-
dimensional object onto a flat piece of linen; but they are not 
what is to be painted, only what has allowed the painter to give 
the impression of depth before they are erased.  In the same way, 
a network is not what is represented in the text, but what readies 
the text to take the relay of actors as mediators.  The consequence 
is that you can provide an actor-network account of topics which 
have in no way the shape of a network – a symphony, a piece of 
legislation, a rock from the moon, an engraving.  Conversely, you 
may well write about technical networks – television, emails, 
satellites, salesforce – without at any point providing an actor-
network account’ (Latour, 2005: 131)   
 
The first part of the passage about the grid and the painting resembles 
Goffman’s remark in the afterword to The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
that the dramaturgical metaphor is a scaffolding that can be taken away once 
the building is erected.  Latour seems equally relaxed about network; it is a 
device for organising the material, nothing more, nothing less: you can give 
an actor network account of anything.    
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 Yet in other places the methodological status of network as device 
looks less secure, and Latour writes about it as though, like the modern 
constitution, it is a reality he has discovered:   
 
Now we cannot have it both ways.  Either the networks my 
colleagues in science studies and I have traced do not really exist, 
and the critics are quite right to marginalize them or segment 
them into three distinct sets: fact, power, discourse; or the 
networks are as we have described them, and they do cross the 
border of the great fiefdoms of criticism: they are neither 
objective, nor social, nor are they effects of discourse, even 
though they are real and collective and discursive (Latour, 2005: 
132).   
 
So despite the claims often made for them, networks turn out to be less an 
observer’s tool than a more important or deeper component of reality.  As  
with the ‘society’ he seeks to problematize, ‘network’ looks like a default 
explanatory reference point in any empirical investigation into the links 
between social and natural, human and non-human phenomena.   The actor 
network theorist claims to have discovered networks in much the same way 
as Freud discovered the unconscious, deep down.  In We Have Never been 
Modern we read:     
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the great masses of nature and society can be compared to the 
cooled-down continents of plate tectonics.  If we want to 
understand their movement, we have to go down into those 
searing rifts where the magma erupts and on the basis of this 
eruption are produced – much later and much farther off, by 
cooling and progressive stacking – the two continental plates on 
which our feet are firmly planted.  Like the geophysicians, we 
have to go down and approach the places where the mixtures are 
made that will become – but only much later – aspects of nature 
or the social. (Latour, 1993: 87) 
 
Later, perhaps sensing the affinities between this and the tradition he 
purports to reject, he abandons this depth imagery, so much so that now, 
sociology ‘should find its firm ground on shifting sands’ (Latour, 2005: 24).  
Whereas sociologists of the social, who invoke ‘society’, believe that they 
can rise above the world and glide like angels, actor network theorists know 
that they have to trudge like…ants’ (Latour, 2005: 25).  The shifting sands 
do not, apparently, preclude the existence of paths and tracks, but they do 
discourage the conventional default mode of the mainstream sociologist: ‘as 
soon as we get out of some interaction, we should ignore the giant signs 
‘towards context’ or ‘to structure’; we should turn at a right angle, leave the 
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motorways, and choose instead to walk through a tiny path not much wider 
than a donkey’s trail’ (Latour, 2005: 171).  This is hard because for years 
social scientists have been unable to resist the temptation to add a third 
dimension to the flat plane of interaction and to call it ‘context’ or 
‘structure’: ‘this explains why they make such an inordinate consumption of 
three-dimensional images: spheres, pyramids, monuments, systems, 
organisms, organizations…It might seem odd at first but we have to 
become the Flat-Earthers of social theory’ (Latour, 2005: 172).  In 
mainstream sociology, ‘whenever we speak of society, we imagine a massive 
monument or sphere, something like a huge cenotaph.  There is a pecking 
order from top to bottom’ (Latour, 2005: 183).   
One wonders, as Freud himself might have done, how many 
sociologists picture to themselves a huge cenotaph when they think about 
society; in The Social Animal Runciman does say that the ‘obvious way to 
visualise the distribution of power in society is through the image of an 
inverted pyramid’ (Runciman, 1998: ????), but it is not obvious that the 
language of ‘system’ or ‘organisation’ depends on three-dimensional 
imagery.  The curious thing about Latour’s apparent disdain for such 
imagery is that he has sung the praises of Peter Sloterdijk’s Spheres, even 
suggesting that the metaphor of spheres has affinities with that of network 
(Latour, 2008).  But the point about Sloterdijk’s uncompromising 
philosophical anthropology, both its glory and its frustration, is that it will 
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never take you inside a laboratory or a law court or anywhere else to do the 
painstaking ethnographic work that is Latour’s strength.  Indeed, one 
wonders why Latour would see such an affinity until one reads that ‘it’s one 
of the ambitions of ANT to keep the prophetic urge that has always been 
associated with the social sciences’ (Latour, 2005: 190).    
The fruits of that urge will be examined later.  For now, though, how 
new is the network metaphor?  And how new is the idea, which has excited 
Latour’s followers even more than that of network, of blurring the 
boundaries between the agential statuses of human and non-human actors?    
‘Network theory’ was developed in the 1960s by the mathematically 
oriented sociologist Harrison White and his followers.  Understandably this 
is never mentioned by ANTers; yet the idea of network in the less technical 
sense, the one more congenial to them, has an even older pedigree.    In 
Steven Marcus’ study of Engels, for instance, we read: ‘the notion of the 
web is to be found almost everywhere.  It is prominently there in the later 
Dickens, it is all over the place in George Eliot, particularly in Middlemarch 
and it figures prominently for Darwin in The Origin of Species.  It forms as it 
were the underlying structural conception of sociology, which regards 
society as a web of relations’ (Marcus, 1974: 57-58).  Marcus may well be 
wrong about sociology, at least about what it became in the 20th century.  
But his point about webs of relations in 19th century thought is well taken, as 
for that matter is Rudolf Arnheim’s suggestion that the idea of network can 
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be traced back in principle to the philosophy of ancient China 
(Arnheim, ???).   
Of course, the web of relations to which Marcus refers is a web of 
relations between human beings, while Latour and his ANT colleagues seek 
to introduced a radically new note into the study of such relations by 
including non-human actors as equal partners, or actants, in the webs or 
networks that social inquiry ought to find interesting and important.   
Here again, however, the idea that human and non-human actors 
might be placed in the same space, that they might interact with one another 
in a democratic flat land, an egalitarian discworld in which nature and 
society are co-produced, is not as new as Latour thinks. At one point, for 
instance, he writes that it is ‘only through some continuous familiarity with 
literature that ANT sociologists might become less wooden, less rigid, less 
stiff in their definition of what sort of agencies populate the world’.  The 
point is well taken, yet when called upon to give examples of literature that 
can do what the conventional social sciences cannot, all he can manage is 
the work of one of the most didactic novelists in North America, Richard 
Powers, himself the author of a gushing review of Latour’s study of the 
abortive French railway project, Aramis (Latour, 1996).   Perhaps the reason 
for the thinness of his references here is that he wishes to take things into a 
world – the world of his non-reductionist ‘experimental metaphysics’ - 
where sociology’s angels fear to tread.  
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 ‘A billiard ball hitting another one on the green felt of a billiard 
table might have exactly as much agency as a “person” directing 
her “gaze” to the “rich human world” of another “meaningful 
face” in the smoke-filled room of the pub where the tables have 
been set up’ (Latour, 2005: 61).  
‘If action is limited apriori to what “intentional”, “meaningful” 
humans do, it is hard to see how a hammer, a basket, a door 
closer, a cat, a rug, a mug, a list, or a tag could act’ (Latour, 2005: 
71).  
  
Quite so.  But does one need a robust philosophy of the social sciences in 
order to see this?  Numerous historians have demonstrated convincingly the 
role played in society by objects without having had to see them as having 
‘as much agency as’ human beings.  A brief list would include Carolyn 
Steedman on ‘what a rag rug means’ (Steedman, 1998), Jack Goody on files 
and flowers (Goody, 1977, 1993); most of the many scholars who now study 
monuments and the controversies that surround human comportment 
towards them (Young, 1993, Gumpert, 1987); or Williams’ The Bells of Russia, 
featuring the episode from 1591 in which, following the murder of 
Tsarevich Dmitrii, the church bell of the town of Uglich was lowered, had 
its tongue (clapper) cut out, was given 120 lashes and exiled to Siberia.  Film 
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makers since the Russian constructivists of the 1920s have done this; 
compare too the scene in Patrick Keiller’s quasi-documentary film London,  
where the unseen protagonist Robinson ‘listens’ to what the gateposts in the 
park tell him, with that in Joseph Roth’s novel Weights and Measures, where 
the hapless protagonist Anselm Eibenschutz sits listening to his desklamp in 
the hope that it might provide him with answers to life’s conundrums.  And 
what of the relationship between human and non-human entities that has 
been explored with such brilliance by Alain Robbe-Grillet, Jorge Luis 
Borges or Nicholson Baker? Latour says of the ‘things’ that ANTers study, 
that ‘specific tricks have to be invented to make them talk’ (Latour, 2005: 
79); they do, but they have been available to and used by historians, 
novelists and film-makers for a long time.  Indeed, in the mid nineteenth 
century Heinrich Heine observes that the attribution of agential properties is 
a standard feature of the German fairy tale: ‘A needle and a pin leave the 
tailor’s hostel and lose their way in the dark;  a piece of straw and a lump of 
coal try to cross the river and are drowned; a shovel and a broom, standing 
on the staircase, quarrel and come to blows;…even drops of blood begin to 
speak, uttering dark and fearful words of concern and compassion’ (Heine,  
2006: ??) 
None if this is to deny the achievement of the ethnographies of 
science, technology and law; they could only have been carried out on the 
basis of an openness to the myriad connections that make possible the 
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finished products that we call a scientific fact, a medical discovery, a 
technical artefact, or the law.   What makes them so riveting is that they 
manage to leave no thread hanging, no stone unturned, but never lose sight 
of the larger significance of what is being investigated.  In tracing what 
Czesław Miłosz called ‘the fine tissue of becoming’ (Milosz, 1981: 146) they 
tell us something nuanced and interesting about the world we live in, and 
nowhere better than in The Making of Law, the compelling ethnography of 
the French Conseil d’Etat.   
Indeed, the analytical shortcomings of Latour’s handling of 
metaphor, and the more extreme claims about human and non-human 
objects – does it really enhance our inquiry if we attribute agency to the 
sheep walking along the Champs Elysees in a protest by French farmers? - 
can be taken with a pinch of salt when reading the empirical investigations, 
where the material - the scientists and their equipment, the lawyers and their 
files, the engineers and their trains, all of them and their meetings - is itself a 
source of intellectual discipline.   
The difficulty is that Latour wants us to take this with more than a 
pinch of salt.  He wants his experimental metaphysics to be more than a  
device that can aid inquiry: he wants it to be the basis for a new vision of 
politics.  
 
Reimagining Politics 
23 
 
In Pandora’s Hope, Latour writes:  
 
It is often said that twentieth-century people’s bodies are 
intoxicated by sugar, slowly poisoned by a fabulous excess of 
carbohydrates unfit for organisms that have evolved for eons on a 
sugar-poor diet.  This is a good metaphor for the Body Politic, 
slowly poisoned by a fabulous excess of Reason. (Latour, 1999: 
264)  
 
Here, as in We Have Never Been Modern, Latour wants to keep rationalism out 
of politics, but now the Oakeshottian version of anti-rationalism has been 
abandoned.  Instead of invoking continuity, he wants both to explain how 
Western political thought has seen a politics based on reason as the one 
thing needful, and to re-imagine politics in order that politics might better 
confront the challenges that face humanity. In particular, he wants to show 
us how politics might look when we do away with the separation of powers 
- politics and science - defined by the modern constitution.  The task now is 
top ‘bring science into democracy’.   
 Recall that the modern constitution both separated science and 
politics and allowed for the proliferation of hybrid formations that that 
constitution was then itself powerless to prevent or make sense of.  Latour 
needed to explain where this constitution came from, how it was that 
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modern human beings had come to think in this way, how they had kidded 
themselves that they were in fact modern.  Before he took to the flat lands 
and the donkey trails, Latour was still looking for the source of it down 
below, even resorting to volcanic imagery.  In The Politics of Nature he is still 
going down after a fashion, only now, not into flowing magma but into solid 
rock: it turns out that the separation between science and politics, the 
modern barrier to an appreciation of the fact that we have never been 
modern, is a result of our shared attachment, not to a modern image at all, 
but to one that has persisted for two and a half millennia, Plato’s myth of 
the.  It is this that:   
 
allows a constitution that organizes public life into two houses.  
The first is the obscure room depicted by Plato, in which ignorant 
people find themselves in chains, unable to look directly at one 
another, communicating only via fictions projected onto a sort of 
movie screen; the second is located outside, in a world made up 
not of humans but of nonhumans, indifferent to our quarrels, our 
ignorances, and the limits of our representations and fictions.  
The genius of the model stems from the role played by a very 
small number of persons, the only ones capable of going back 
and forth between the two assemblies and converting the 
authority of the one into that of the other.  Despite the 
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fascination exerted by Ideas (even upon those who claim to be 
denouncing the idealism of the Platonic solution), it is not at all a 
question of opposing the shadow world to the real world, but of 
redistributing powers by inventing both a certain definition of 
science and a certain definition of politics.  Appearance 
notwithstanding, idealism is not what is at issue here.  The myth 
of the cave makes it possible to render all democracy impossible 
by neutralizing it; that is its only trump card. (Latour, 2004: 14) 
 
Latour returns to Plato’s cave myth repeatedly (Latour, 2004: 14, 16, 40, 128, 
176), suggesting at one point that if sociology is to stop making the same old 
mistake, that of saying that nature is socially constructed but society is not, if 
it is to break with ‘the deceptive self-evidence of the social sciences’, and 
with social constructionism, it must ‘change the notion of the social, which 
we inherited, like the rest, from the age of the cave’ (Latour, 2004: 37).  The 
one we have inherited is, apparently, the image of the social world as prison; 
the new one that Latour suggests we adopt is the image of the social world 
as an association.  In the first version scientists are capable of ‘breaking with 
society to achieve objectivity, of rendering mute things assimilable by human 
language, and finally, of coming back ‘to earth’ to organise society according 
to the ideal models supplied by reason’ (Latour, 2004: 38).  As for politics, 
Latour wants to get away from an idea that also has its roots in the cave 
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metaphor, namely the idea that we can appeal to ‘the external world’ in 
order to bring political discussion to an end.  Instead he wants to appeal to 
ever more elements of the external world in order to reanimate political 
discussion.  This discussion will take place in what he calls, obscurely, ‘the 
collective’.   Such a collective will be a common space in which science and 
non-science, human and non-human, cooperate and forge a sense of what a 
common world ought to look like.  In such a common, flattened out space, 
‘science no longer kidnaps reality to transform it into an appellate court of 
last resort, threatening public life with a promise of salvation worse than the 
evil against which it offers protection.  Everything the human sciences had 
imagined about the social world to construct their disciplines at a remove 
from natural sciences was borrowed from the prison of the cave’ (Latour, 
2004: 40).   
 Why has this myth persisted?  ‘The reason can only be political – or 
religious’ (Latour, 2004: 13).  Latour’s helplessness here is instructive, and 
might have led him to wonder whether the myth is as easily overcome as he 
suggests. Blumenberg didn’t think so, and wrote his most demanding book 
about it, collecting all of the major variations and reworkings of the image of 
‘the exit from the cave’ that make up part of our intellectual tradition 
(Blumenberg, 1989).  In fact, the more you read Blumenberg the more you 
realise that he does for intellectual history just what Latour himself is 
prepared to do in science studies, that is, he brings together many of the 
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threads and connections that have gone into the making of the myth we call 
Plato’s myth of the cave, this matter of mythical fact that was not simply the 
work of one original mind but of a whole tradition of poets, playwrights, 
philosophers, and other thinkers who make up the Western intellectual 
tradition.  The fact that Latour thinks himself able to dismiss Plato’s cave 
myth so easily is made all the more remarkable by his reference in one of his 
increasingly common prize acceptance speeches, ‘Coming out as a 
Philosopher’, to his own doctorate (Latour, 2009).  This was about Rudolf 
Bultmann, one of whose projects was on the relationship between Jesus’ 
original message and the accumulated weight of commentary and 
interpretation that has gathered around it (Bultmann, 1958).  Latour says 
that the idea of getting back to the original, authentic message of Jesus 
seemed absurd; the commentaries were just as much part of the Christian 
tradition as the original message, which was in any case a meagre one.  
Yet just this is Blumenberg’s point about myths: the history of myths is 
the history of the work that has been done on them, the variations to which 
they have been subject, what Latour would call the ‘work of mediation’.  But 
just as he is sensitive to this work of mediation when carried out by 
scientists in search of the truth, Latour is uninterested in the variations, the 
work of mediation that has been carried out on Plato’s myth of the cave:   
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weaker in this respect than the biblical story of the fall, the myth 
begins with a state of abjection whose origin it carefully refrains 
from revealing.  Now, no original sin requires public life to begin 
with the age of the caves.  Since enlightenment can blind us only 
if (political) epistemology makes us go down into the cave in the 
first place, there exists a much simpler means than Plato’s to get 
out of the cave: we need not climb down into it to begin with’ 
(Latour, 2004: 16)  
 
When you say this you also ignore the further challenge of Blumenberg’s 
work, namely his suggestion that attempting to bring a defining myth of the 
Western intellectual tradition to an end is itself a piece of rationalism, and as 
hubristic as that of those who believe that politics might be corrected by 
science.      
    Interestingly, now that he has become a flat-earther, Latour 
represents the myth of the cave not via a painting or even a geological 
cross-section featuring heights and depths and tunnels, but through a 
more rationalistic device, a diagrammatic table on a flat piece of paper. 
Putting these relationships into a diagram will make it easier for him to 
reformulate his and our understanding of politics.  The diagram will 
become what Michael Lynch has called ‘a visible work space’.    
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society nature 
Chattering of 
fictions by those 
(politicians) who 
speak with no 
authority (authority 
about reality) 
Silence of reality on 
and authority of 
those who don’t 
speak  
Politics Science 
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    Experts1 
 
In a formulation that once again goes beyond standard anti-rationalism, 
Latour says that ‘western political thought has been paralysed for a long 
time by this threat from elsewhere’, the elsewhere being science.  The appeal 
to this human/non-human hybrid straw man allows him to ask ‘how can we 
conceive of a democracy that does not live under the constant threat that 
would come from science?’ (Latour, 2004: 17).  Elsewhere he uses a starker 
image of the relationship between politics and science: civil war. 
 So the diagram above represents his reconstruction of the dominant 
assumptions of the age, with politics and science in separate domains and 
the latter as a solution to the problems of the former.  He wants to rid us of 
these images of Science (knowledge) and politics (power), and replace it with 
                                                 
1 It is interesting here to compare Latour’s image of the expert as one who shuttles 
back and forth between science and politics with that of Alfred Schutz.  Schutz saw 
the expert as belonging firmly in one of the two halves, subscribing to the ‘because 
motives’ that defined science, with its firm borders between relevance and 
irrelevance, just as the man of the street (man of the cave?) operated with his or her 
recipe knowledge. We live in a civilization in which everyday life is pervaded 
increasingly by the results of the activities of scientists, but Schutz identified the 
problem not as experts shuttling back and forth between the cave of politics and the 
light of science, but as an alliance between expertise and public opinion.  The capacity 
to move between the two is reserved for a third figure, the well-informed citizen.  For 
Schutz, then, the man of the street is stuck in the cave with his recipe knowledge, but 
the expert is in another cave, with his own set of shadows (Schutz, 1964).   
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another, ‘more realistic’ one, of the sciences as they are practised (and as 
Latour’s ethnographies have shown them to be practised) and of politics as 
it is increasingly practised  
 The version of politics that fits most closely with this reconfigured 
image is what he calls ‘political ecology’.   Political ecology, Latour suggests, 
is not a blueprint but a practice, something that is taking place throughout 
the advanced industrial democracies, and points towards a way of thinking 
that will avoid the twin extremes of deep ecology metaphysics on the one 
hand and liberal humanism on the other.  The latter, afraid of science as it is 
of nature, does not understand that what threatens democracy is not what 
scientists do, but what we think it is that they do.  Once we realise that what 
they do is the human activity laid bare in Latour’s ethnographies, we will 
find it easier to imagine the sciences as being part of democracy and not as 
the promised rationalist corrective to our political errors.  Similarly, the 
strength of political ecology as it is practised is not nature worship or nature 
protection but the dissolution of nature’s boundaries; political ecology is just 
as interventionist towards nature as modern science: it establishes previously 
unthought-of connections between humans and non-humans, doing in 
practice what Latour would like to do in theory.  In environmental disputes 
or those about embryo research and so on, nobody is having opinions 
‘about’ nature, rather they are trying to work out what sort of common 
world they want to live in.  And as long as the collectivity in which this is 
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taking place is not a community of fate but a complicated set of 
associations, it will retain its democratic character.  These public disputes are 
a good thing, and political ecology has contributed more to this version of 
democracy than other sorts of political philosophy.  It has enabled us to 
stop asking about matters of fact and start asking about matters of concern, 
to change the question from the apolitical one of ‘what is out there?’ to the 
political one of  ‘what kind of a world do we want to live in?’  With matters 
of fact there are clear boundaries: seen in these terms, asbestos, for instance, 
was a modernist object, for decades remaining risk-free before people 
started asking questions about it.  Matters of concern have no clear 
boundaries, they ‘take on the aspect of tangled beings, forming rhizomes 
and networks’ (Latour, 2004: 24).     
There are several difficulties here.  The first is that when the move 
from matters of fact to matters of concern is crowned with the assertion 
that the question ‘what sort of world do we want to live in?’ is the only 
question that matters, the spectre of Lysenkoism and Aryan science is never 
far away.  Latour has repeatedly dismissed such reminders as a misreading of 
his work, but the fact that some fairly discerning critics – and not only the ‘is 
the glass on the table or not?’ brigade - have made them suggests a failure to 
locate his work more precisely in the history of ideas, in the story or 
tradition of which he, no less than his readers, is a part.   Perhaps ‘failure’ is 
not the right word here, for it suggests some sort of attempt, whereas it is 
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the cavalier attitude to the history of western social and political theory that 
makes possible the freedom to imagine a future ‘pluriverse’ or ‘cosmos to be 
built’.  Yet the disregard for the history of ideas itself has a long history, 
stepping outside the tradition is another part of the rationalist tradition.  
Latour is never more firmly within it than when he is jumping beyond it:  
 
Once we have exited from the great political diorama of ‘nature in 
general’ we are left with only the banality of multiple associations 
of humans and nonhumans waiting for their unity to be provided 
by work carried out by the collective, which has to be specified 
through the uses of the resources, concepts, and institutions of all 
peoples who may be called upon to live in common on an earth 
that might become, through a long work of collection, the same 
earth for all.  (Latour, 2004: 46) 
 
Political ecology, then, yields to the grander vision of what politics will have 
to look like when the modern constitution has been overthrown and politics 
has been redefined: ‘Not everything is political perhaps, but politics gathers 
everything together, so long as we agree to redefine politics as the entire set of 
tasks that allow the progressive composition of a common world’.  Political 
philosophy hitherto has focused only on human politics, leaving other 
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questions, such as the relationship between human beings and nature, to be 
sorted out elsewhere.   
To get us to think about that relationship he resorts to legal language, 
talking about the ‘illegality’ and the ‘illegitimacy’ of each side of the old 
constitutional divide, and of a ‘due process’ through which a new ‘collective’ 
can be formed that will include the ‘third estate’ that lost out to the twin 
evils of power (politics) and reason (science): ‘I am not proposing to replace 
a well-organized system with a quirky one, but to substitute two houses put 
together according to due process for the two illegitimate houses of the old 
Constitution’ (Latour, 2004:128).  His term for his new collective in which a 
common world will be fabricated is the old res publica, a word that if we 
understand it correctly brings the word ‘thing’ back to its original meaning, 
an assembly or gathering (as in the Icelandic/Germanic medieval 
parliament, the Dinggenossenschaft). ‘The empire [sic] of the modernist 
constitution, now on the decline, had made us tend to forget that a thing 
emerges before anything else as  a scandal at the heart of an assembly that 
carries on a discussion requiring a judgment brought in common’.     
 The modern constitution may be on the decline, but the job of the 
philosopher/anthropologist/sociologist turned political theorist is to hurry 
it along.  How can it be done?  Well, once you are on the flat plain walking 
is much easier than when you have to clamber in and out of a cave, and so 
Latour’s deceptively simple answer is: by rewriting it!  Or more accurately, 
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by constructing a diagram of it, including in the diagram a few cleverly-
worded definitions, rotating that diagram through 90%, and – hey presto! - 
making a whole new political universe appear.  It is a bravura performance, 
but also one that seems oddly familiar to students of Talcott Parsons or 
Jurgen Habermas (Baldamus, 1992). 
 A notable feature of The Politics of Nature is how, through a curious 
combination of French-style theoretical verve and Parsons-like doggedness, 
Latour tries to rethink the fact-value distinction.  When he says that ‘it is 
surely no longer possible to oppose the scientific world of indubitable facts 
to the political world of endless discussion’ (Latour, 2004: 63), he knows 
that there is work for the political theorist to do, that the practice of political 
ecology alone will not bring it about.  That is why he says, as French 
thinkers have had to say several times before in the last two centuries, ‘I 
want this common world to be achieved after the new constitution has been 
drafted, not before’.   In the old constitution the common good (value) and 
the common world (fact) were treated as separate; in the new constitution 
they must come together so that the question of the ‘good common world, of 
the best of possible worlds, of the cosmos’ can be raised (Latour, 2004: 93).   
 The first move in the drafting of a new constitution is to break down 
the meaning of ‘fact’ and of ‘value’.   So:  
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- ‘fact’ refers to two entirely different procedures, (i) an entity puzzles 
participants in a discussion, say in the lab (perplexity); (ii) discussion 
is brought to an end (institution). 
- ‘value’ also involves two procedures:  (iii) increasing the number of 
voices in a discussion (‘have we taken these voices into account?’; (iv) 
establishing a hierarchy – where do new propositions fit into this 
hierarchy of considerations?. 
 
Latour’s proposal here is that i) and iii) are similar (they are both part of 
what he calls ‘the power to take into account’) and ii) and iv) are similar 
(they are both part of what he calls ‘the power to put into order’).  Now 
once you have broken down two categories into four, you can regroup them 
in a diagram.  Here Latour’s claim that ‘we are only describing more 
concisely what the impossible fact-value distinction sought to make 
indescribable’ (Latour, 2004: 111) is as disingenuous as the claim quoted 
earlier that networks ‘come out of hiding’.   But one can see the point when 
Latour uses it to describe a real world case, say that of prions and mad cow 
disease.  Then we can say that there are two procedures involved, two stages 
– the power to take into account means that the voices of the president, 
scientific advisers, meat-eaters, prions, cows and sheep are considered 
relevant to the discussion; the power to put into order means that in the end 
some policy has to be formulated on the basis of a hierarchy of priorities, in 
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which we ask whether mad cow disease killed anyone, and note that 8000 
are killed in traffic accidents every year.  Latour suggests that breaking the 
issue down into ‘power to take into account’ and ‘power to put into order’ 
enables us to see something of the texture of public policy that the bald fact-
value distinction is bound to obscure.   
The problem is that this is followed by another move, the setting 
down a blueprint.   
 
 
 
 
In all the following diagrams, I will use the metaphor of lower 
and upper house to designate these two assemblies that re-dissect 
the collective unified in the previous chapter.  The metaphor is a 
bit far-fetched I know, but I want to retain as many of the terms 
associated with our Western democratic tradition as possible. 
(Latour, 2004: 268)      
   OLD BICAMERALISM 
      House of nature                      house of 
society 
      Facts            values 
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First house: taking 
into account 
 
 
 
 
second house:  
arranging in rank 
order 
 
NEW BICAMERALISM 
 
 
Such diagrams, with their boxes demanding to be filled with words, recall 
those that feature heavily in - and according to some accounts define - the 
work of Talcott Parsons and Jurgen Habermas.  And when Latour adds 2 
more requirements or tasks to the four already outlined, they sound 
somewhat like what Parsons called Latency, the L function in his famous 
AGIL four function schema: 
 
   perplexity  
 
                                 
1 
 
        consultation 
 
2 
  
                                 
4 
 
    institution 
 
3 
      
       hierarchy 
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(v) keeping the activities of the new first house and the new 
second house as separate as were nature and society in the old 
constitution. 
(vi) ‘scenarization of the collective in a unified whole’.  
So it turns out that there three broad powers: the power to take into 
account, the power to put in order, and, embodied in tasks v) and vi), the 
power to govern.  This power to govern is, apparently, the opposite of 
modernist mastery; instead it is a series of trials that makes up what Latour 
calls, ‘a learning process’, a phrase that, though it crops up frequently in the 
work of Habermas and other representatives of the ‘modern critical stance’, 
is supposed to mean something other than a drive towards Kantian 
maturity: ‘in modernism, as we know, there was never any real feedback’ 
(Latour, 2004: 200).   
  Associated with these six tasks are the specific skills of specific 
professionals. Not that scientists should perform task number (i) and others 
should perform other tasks; on the contrary, scientists can bring their skills 
to bear on all of the tasks of the collective.  So can politicians: ‘The term 
‘politician’ does not correspond to a precise profession, any more than the 
term ‘scientist’ does [at this point Latour indicates a diagram in which the 
word ‘skill (for example of politicians)’ appears at the top with a line 
pointing towards each task]; we are simply starting with existing callings, as 
good sense offers them to us…’ (Latour, 2004: 143)  Be that as it may, it 
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turns out that both scientists and politicians have ways of intermingling 
humans and nonhumans, of taking things into account, of putting things in 
order, and that these separate sets of skills can be combined.  The same is 
true of economists: ‘When homo economicus designated the foundation of 
universal anthropology, the inquiry into the composition of the world 
ceased at once.  But if we use the term ‘global economy’ to designate a 
provisional version offered to the collective that will allow it to list one list 
of entities and reject another, then economics, like all the social sciences, 
plays an indispensable role: it reflexively represents the collective to itself’ 
(Latour, 2004: 150).  Economics is the only profession than can make ‘a 
scale model of the common world’; ‘Nothing could link black holes, rivers, 
transgenic soy beans, farmers, the climate, human embryos, and humanized 
pigs in an ordered relation, in one single cosmogram.  Thanks to the 
economic calculation, all these entities become at least commensurable’ 
(Latour, 2004: 151-2)  And the moralists?  Well, they are good at task (i) 
(with their scruple, allowing extra things to be considered) and at (vi) 
(making sure the collective is viewed from the outside as well as the inside) 
but they are really good at (iii) (establishing a hierarchy of priorities).  The 
most important thing is that they are not impotent as they were under the 
old constitution, facing an amoral nature and an immoral society and having 
nothing to offer but the moral law.  This effort to rethink the meaning and 
practice of politics is then encapsulated in just the sort of table for which 
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Parsons was famous, one in which, having set up a series of 6 tasks and 4 
types of agent to perform them, and having said that each agent can 
contribute something to each of the tasks, you have to end up with 24 mini 
job-descriptions (Latour, 2004: 162-3).  The four types of agent are: 
politicians, scientists, economists and moralists.  Sociologists are notably 
absent.   
The result of all this will be that ‘we no longer have a society 
surrounded by nature, but a collective producing a clear distinction between 
what it has internalized and what it has externalized’ (Latour, 2004: 124)  In 
the example of mad cow disease and prions, mention was made of the 8000 
deaths on the roads and how these were considered not that important, or a 
price worth paying: ‘Even if this may appear shocking at first glance, no 
moral principle is superior to the procedure of the progressive composition 
of the common world; for the time being the rapid use of cars is ‘worth’ 
much more in France than 8000 innocent lives per year’ (Latour, 2004: 124), 
‘representation rather than short-circuit is the goal of political ecology.  As I 
see it there is a reserve of morality here that is much more inexhaustible and 
much more discriminating than the vain indignation whose goal was to 
prevent the contamination of values by facts or of facts by values’ (Latour, 
2004: 127). 
Latour often presents his re-imagination of the political landscape as 
a response to a set of conclusions he has drawn from the empirical study of 
42 
 
how political disputes are conducted, how science is done, who the actors 
involved are, and from reflection on the ways in which this 
political/moral/economic/scientific reality has been persistently 
misdescribed by realist philosophers of science, social constructionist 
sociologists, normative political theorists, and not described at all by the 
more talented writers from the Geisteswissenchaften. Yet it is also grounded in 
an ‘experimental metaphysics’, and here his effort to reconstruct the world 
and to see into the future looks oddly familiar to the student of the history 
of sociology.  Indeed, of its prehistory.  For it turns out that there is a 7th 
task, described mysteriously as that of  ‘following through’ on the promises 
and the achievements of the 6 tasks performed by our four select agents of a 
world made in common.   When we are told that it is best performed by 
diplomats and administrators, we hear the voice of Saint-Simon.   
 
Conclusion 
The claim that ‘with political ecology, we truly enter another world…’ 
(Latour, 2004: 211) is something of a hostage to fortune, but Latour thinks 
we can do so because that world is already being made, in the dialogues and 
disputes and trials and negotiations that increasingly make up the political 
landscape, a landscape that sociology finds it difficult to see because it is 
either driving too fast along the motorway towards its overhasty 
conclusions, or sitting behind the monoliths it has constructed and that it 
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calls ‘society’;  normative political theory cannot see it either, preoccupied as 
it is with the foundations of justice or the nature of evil.   The ways of 
political world-making are there before us if we would slow down 
(sociology) or get moving (political theory).    
 When Latour presents his case as an ethnographer of science, 
technology and law, he is immensely persuasive.  But he also presents 
himself as an anti-reductionist philosopher who wants us to change some of 
the basic ways in which we think.   To the untrained ear the idea – to which 
Latour remains straight-facedly committed - that human and non-human 
objects have equal degrees of agency, continues to sound forced, to strike a 
discordant note.   It may also strike the reader as ironic that a writer who has 
sought to grant agency to non-human objects should treat devices such as 
metaphors and diagrams as passive instruments that will bend to his 
theoretical will.     
Doubtless the future of the human sciences – and of politics - is now 
more open than it once appeared to be: the collective formed by Latour’s 
trudging ants is unlikely to disappear.  But if ANT’s fans and practitioners 
believe that those ants will inherit the earth, they might reflect that even in 
the event of the monuments built by and the motorways used by sociology 
becoming ruins in a windswept desert, they may still have to share the 
donkey trails with the solitary walkers of the Geisteswissenchaften, and that 
those solitary walkers may go up and down as well as across, zigzagging 
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vertically as well as horizontally; if they crush a few ants along the way, it 
will be because they are also looking ahead, determined to see more, and to 
tell others what it is they have seen and what they think it means.   Can one, 
in any case, retain the prophetic urge without wanting, now and again, to go 
up a mountain?    
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